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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The opening brief of defendant-appellant Robert Michael
Greene demonstrated that he and his former wifef plaintiffrespondent Cherie Annette Greenef agreed by stipulation to treat
defendant's military retired pay as a source of income from which
to pay spousal support, terminable upon plaintiff's remarriage,
and not as marital property.

Notwithstanding the parties'

agreement, the trial court amended the Divorce Decree to classify
the retired pay as marital property, thereby requiring defendant
to pay plaintiff half of that income for the rest of his life.
Defendant's opening brief demonstrates that the trial court's
ruling is contrary to Utah law and constitutes an abuse of
discretion because the Decree was modified without a showing or
finding of changed circumstances or compelling reasons.
In her response brief plaintiff seeks to avoid a full
review of the issues by arguing that the facts were misrepresented, that the central issue was not raised below, and that the
Decree was not modified.

Those arguments have no merit.

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff argues that defendant misrepresented the
facts; yet, plaintiff's statement of facts closely tracks
defendant's in most material respects.

The principal factual

dispute is whether the parties, in their Stipulation and
Agreement, divided defendant's military retired pay as marital

property or as spousal support.

As plaintiff noted, both parties

expressed a desire to introduce evidence on that issue, but the
trial court declined, choosing instead to resolve the issue on
the face of the Stipulation and the other documents already in
the record.

(Tr. 32-34.)

On the face of the Stipulation it is clear that the
parties did not list the military retired pay as property in the
three paragraphs designating and dividing the marital assets.
(Addendum to Appellant's Brief 4-5, hereafter "Add.")

The

retired pay is mentioned only in paragraph eight dealing with
payment of spousal and child support.

Plaintiff disputes the

figure of $1,370.00 in spousal support (Resp. Br. 3 ) ; however,
the $490 portion labeled "alimony" plus the $880 portion constituting one-half of the gross retired pay equals a total spousal
support payment of $1,370.00.

That figure was obviously designed

by the parties to meet plaintiff's "Proposed Budget" of
$1,350.00, which jls_ in the record (contrary to plaintiff's claim
at Resp. Br. 3 ) .

(R. 49-50; Add. 20-21.)

Plaintiff also

disputes that defendant reported the full $1370 support payment
as alimony on his tax records (Resp. Br. 3 ) ; however, defendant's
affidavit attesting to that fact, as well as to the parties'
original intent, stands uncontradicted in the record.
Add. 20.)

(R. 49;

Thus, the face of the documents indicates that the

parties did not consider the retired pay as property, but as
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income from which to pay spousal support.

If this Court

considers the Stipulation ambiguous, it should reverse and remand
the case for presentation of evidence and specific findings on
the issue of the military retired pay.
Plaintiff also questions defendant's construction of
the 1984 modification order.

(Resp. Br. 2, 4.)

The only rele-

vant effect of that order was to authorize plaintiff to obtain
her half of the military retired pay directly from the Air Force.
In making that order, the court reaffirmed that defendant was
obligated to pay one-half of his "gross Air Force Retirement pay"
(Add. 16), thus indicating no change in the parties' understanding of that phrase as used in their original Stipulation.
The issue whether the retired pay was marital property or
defendant's personal income was neither raised nor decided in the
1984 proceeding.

The court found no change of circumstances

sufficient to warrant modification of the spousal support

obligation; therefore, that obligation continued in the amounts
specified in the Stipulation and Decree.
Finally, it is significant that plaintiff admits the
Divorce Decree was amended to require payment of one-half the net
or disposable military retirement income instead of one-half the
gross income.

(Resp. Br. 8.)

That amendment permitted the court

to classify the retirement pay as marital property rather than
personal income, and thereby alter the parties1 Stipulation.
Plaintiff attempts to soft-pedal that amendment, but in fact it
constitutes reversible error, as discussed below (see Point III).
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS
POINT I;

THE ISSUE WHETHER UTAH LAW PERMITS MILITARY RETIREMENT
INCOME TO BE TREATED AS MARITAL PROPERTY WAS RAISED
AND DECIDED IN THE TRIAL COURT.
Plaintiff argues that the issue regarding treatment of

defendant's military retired pay as marital property or personal

1

Plaintiff considers it significant that the court's 1984
modification order specified continued payment of $490.00 per
month "alimony." However, that designation does not mean that
the one-half gross military retired pay was not also spousal
support. The uneven $490 figure is the approximate residual
difference between the amount plaintiff requested in her
"Proposed Budget" and the maximum support she anticipated from
the retirement income. Only the residual portion of the support
was labled "alimony" because the parties were uncertain how to
designate the money from the Air Force. Since both amounts were
listed consecutively in the same sentence of the Stipulation's
paragraph on support payments, it is evident that they were
intended as separate components of the total spousal support
obligation.

income under Utah law was not raised in the trial court.
Br. 10.)

(Resp.

That arqument has no merit and is obviously intended to

avoid review of the court's ruling.
This dispute began when, upon plaintiff's remarriage,
defendant moved for an order terminating the spousal support
obligation, including the portion paid from his Air Force
retirement income.

(R. 47-48; Add. 18-19.)

Plaintiff filed a

"Response to Defendant's Motion," asserting for the first time
that her half of the military retirement income was not spousal
support subject to termination, but marital property to which she
was entitled for the rest of defendant's life.

(R. 51.)

Those

pleadings thus framed the central issue before the court:
Whether defendant's military retired pay should be classified as
personal income or marital property?

(See Tr. 2-3.)

In deciding that issue, the trial court was obviously
required to rule in accordance with Utah law.

The trial judge

cited Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), for the
unchallenged proposition that nonmilitary pensions may be
considered a marital asset.

(Tr. 16.)

The court also referred

to McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), and the national
interests in treating military retired pay as personal income.

z

The trial court referred to this central issue as "the big
problem" (Tr. 26), or simply as "the issue" (Tr. 36-37).

(Tr. 16-17.)

The court then noted the Former Spouses' Protection

Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, and queried what its effect was on Utah
law:
Do any of you have any cases where this has
come up and been brought before any court where
they interpret under military retirement how or
what standards or goals you may have to determine
in a decree, whether this is for support or
whether it's for a division of the marital asset
or anything of that nature?
[Tr. 17-18.]
Both counsel responded that they had researched the issue but had
found no case directly on point.

The court agreed that it was a

novel question and invited counsel to submit any authorities they
might find.

(Tr. 18-19.)

In its Memorandum Decision the trial court again cited
Woodward and concluded that military retirement income under Utah
law should be treated the same as nonmilitary pensions, i.e.,
subject to division as a marital asset.

(Add. 24-25.)

court's final judgment formalized that ruling.

The

(Add. 28.)

Thus,

the issue of how to treat defendant's military retirement income,
having been raised and decided below, is properly renewed on
appeal and this Court has jurisdiction to review and resolve the
issue.
Plaintiff argues that the Former Spouses' Protection
Act authorizes state courts to treat military retired pay as
marital property (Resp. Br. 11), which defendant does not
dispute.

However, that Act was intended as an accommodation to

community property states and does not require common law
jurisdictions to treat military retired pay as marital
property.

The issue here is whether the trial court's decision

on the issue correctly states Utah law.

The issue is one of

first impression in this state and therefore may not be dictated
by a trial court, but must be conclusively resolved by this
Court.
POINT II; THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY RETIRED PAY
REQUIRE THAT IT BE TREATED AS PERSONAL INCOME RATHER
THAN MARITAL PROPERTY.
Plaintiff relies exclusively on Woodward v. Woodward,
656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982)f for the proposition that military
retired pay should be divided as marital property.
12-14.)

(Resp. Br.

However, Woodward did not decide that issue. In

Woodward the husband was a civilian employee at Hill Air Force
Base, id., and the Court expressly found that his "retirement
benefits are a form of deferred compensation by the employer."
Id. at 432, emp. added.

By contrast, Mr. Greene in the present

case was and is a member of the military, an Air Force officer,
and his retirement income is compensation for current and
continuing service to, and membership in, the nation's Armed
Forces.

(See Appellant's Brief 12-15.)

This characteristic of

military retirement income as compensation for current service
and readiness is the primary reason to distinquish it from
nonmilitary pensions.

Other distinguishing factors, noted in

defendant's opening brief, are that military retirement income
serves the national interest of assurinq available and prepared
armed forces in future contingencies; the income is subject to
divestment for violation of military regulations? and it has no
redemption value, lump sum valuer or value realizable after the
death of the retiree.

Plaintiff simply ignores these

distinguishing characteristics of military retirement income, and
by refusing to discuss themf concedes their validity.
Plaintiff also misreads the scope of Woodward.

That

case did not hold that all pensions must be treated as marital
property, which must be divided between the spouses. Woodward
merely held that the existence of a retirement fund is one factor
to be considered, along with other pertinent circumstances, in
dividing the assets and setting the maintenance of the parties and
children.

656 P.2d at 432. Cf. In re Marriage of Ellis,

538 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Colo. App. 1975) (acknowledging that

^If this Court were to determine that part of defendant's
military retirement income may be deferred compensation for past
services and that the parties' Stipulation intended to divide
that part as property, then plaintiff would be entitled to a
share of only that part, and the case should be remanded for a
hearing and findings on that issue. However, if this Court
concludes that the parties' Stipulation is binding and intended
to treat the retired pay, not as property, but as an income
source from which to pay spousal support, as demonstrated in
Point II of defendant's opening brief, then no further hearing is
necessary and the trial court's Judgment should simply be
reversed.
-8-

military retirement income may be considered in dividing property
and awarding support).

If the parties, by stipulation, choose

not to divide a pension as marital property, that is their
prerogative.
Finally, plaintiff attempts to discredit McCarty v*
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), and the other cases holding that
military retired pay is income rather than property by citing the
Former Spouses' Protection Act and cases from community property
jurisdictions.

As noted above, the federal Act merely altered

the McCarty holding that community property states could not
treat military retired pay as marital property.

The supporting

rationale of McCarty and the other federal cases is still valid
as applied in common law jurisdictions such as Utah.

As

demonstrated by In re Marriage of Mattson, 694 P.2d 1285 (Colo.
App. 1984); Grant v. Grant, 685 P.2d 327 (Kan. App. 1984); Koenes
v. Koenes, 478 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind. App. 1985), and other cases
decided after the federal Act, common law jurisdictions may
continue treating military retired pay as personal income rather
than marital property.*

^Plaintiff questions the authority of Slaughter v.
Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274, 421 P.2d 503 (1966), by misstating the
point for which it was cited. (Resp. Br. 15.) Defendant did not
claim that Slaughter decided the military retirement pay issue.
(See Appellant's Br. 12.) No reported Utah case has decided the
issue.

-9-

POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT DID AMEND THE DIVORCE DECREE TO ALLOW
DEFENDANT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT INCOME TO BE DIVIDED
AS MARITAL PROPERTY.
Plaintiff admits that neither partyf in their
pleadings, requested the trial court to amend the Divorce Decree
and that neither party presented evidence in support of such an
amendment.

(Resp. Br. 20.)

Defendant did not request an

amendment; he merely wanted the Decree enforced as written, to
require termination of the entire spousal support payment upon
plaintiff's remarriage.

Plaintiff did not request an amendment

until she realized the inconsistency and impossibility of
claiming a property interest in one-half of defendant's gross
retired pay.

When the court and the parties all agreed that the

maximum property interest awardable would be one-half the net or
disposable pay, plaintiff's counsel promptly requested "an
amendment to make it net."

(Tr. 20.)

In two subsequent state-

ments plaintiff's counsel renewed that oral plea for an amendment
to the Decree.

(Tr. 21, 35.)

Thus, it is somewhat disingenuous

for plaintiff now to argue that the amendment was defendant's
idea or that defendant agreed to that amendment.

(Resp. Br. 20,

22.)
Plaintiff eventually concedes that the trial court did
in fact amend the Decree as requested to award one-half the net
retired pay.

(Resp. Br. 21.)

The purpose and effect of that

amendment was to allow the retired pay to be classified and

-10-

divided as marital property rather than personal income paid
toward spousal support•

The trial court acknowledged that pur-

pose and effect in its Memorandum Decision (Add. 24-25) and in
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, numbers 3 through 6
(Add. 30-32).

However, the court received no evidence in support

of the amendment and made no finding of changed circumstances or
compelling reasons to justify the amendment, as plaintiff admits
(Resp. Br. 22), and as reguired by Utah law.

E.g., Shioji v.

Shioji, 671 P.2d 135 (Utah 1983); Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d
1303 (Utah 1980); Crofts v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701,
703 (1968) (trial court cannot "change or cancel one word of the
judgment" without a finding of changed circumstances).
Therefore, the amendment must be set aside and the Decree
enforced as originally entered.
Finally, plaintiff argues that principles of contract
construction do not apply in this case because the trial court
was not construing a contract, but was construing only the
Decree.

(Resp. Br. 23-24.)

That argument has no merit.

It is

undisputed that the issue whether the retired pay was divided in
the Stipulation as property or spousal support was not raised

D

In an attempt to excuse the absence of the necessary
finding, plaintiff spends time arguing what the trial court
may have done, but which it concededly did not do. (Resp.
Br. 23.) These arguments reguire no response.
-11-

prior to entry of the Decree,

Because of that factf both parties

offered to present evidence on their interpretation of the
Stipulation.

The trial court refused, stating that he would

review the Stipulation and request parol evidence only if he
considered it ambiguous.

(Tr. 32-34.)

The trial court's

Memorandum Decision also makes clear that the court based its
judgment on a construction of the Stipulation.

(Add. 25.)

Divorce stipulations are considered contracts and are construed
by the same principles as other contracts.

See Land v. Land, 605

P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980); Mathie v. Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116,
363 P.2d 779, 782-84 (1961).

Therefore, in reviewing the trial

court's construction of the parties' Stipulation, this Court must
apply the same standards as used in reviewing the construction of
other contracts.

Under those standards, this Court owes no

deference to the trial court's construction, but is free to make
its own independent interpretation.

E.g., Wade v. Utah Farm

Bureau Ins. Co., 700 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Utah 1985) . 6

°This court may construe the Stipulation in defendant's
favor either on the basis that it was clear on its face in
giving one-half the "gross" retired pay in the same sentence
with other spousal support, or on the basis that it was
ambiguous and should therefore be construed against the
plaintiff, whose attorney drafted it. See Evenson Masonry
Inc. v. Eldred, 273 Or. 770, 543 P.2d 663 (1975) (existence
of ambiguity is question of law reviewable on appeal);
Abbott v. Christensen, 660 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah 1983)
(contract ambiguity interpreted against drafting party).
-12-

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court must reverse the
trial court's Judgment.
Dated this Avday

of February, 1987.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
By
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